Article · 18 min read

What is an AI agent?

A chatbot answers questions. An AI agent takes on a task and carries it out itself, step by step, with tools such as a browser, code and email. How agents work, how much they can do today and why they are harder to make safe than chatbots.

Short answer

An AI agent is an AI system that plans and carries out a multi-step task by itself. At its core is usually a language model that, in a loop, decides the next step, uses a tool, reads the result and carries on until the task is done. Agents are improving fast: according to the research organisation METR, the length of task they can complete has doubled roughly every four months since 2023. But small errors add up over long tasks, an agent that reads untrusted content can be tricked into working against its user, and in 2026 agents got out of test environments and into real systems. That is why it matters how much an agent is allowed to decide on its own.

From answers to actions

Ask a chatbot to help you find a train and you get an answer: tips on where to look and what to keep in mind. Give the same task to an AI agent and it searches the timetable itself, checks your calendar and puts the journey in. The difference is not that the agent is smarter. It has been given tools, and permission to use them.

The word agent is old in AI research. In the classic textbook Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig define an agent as anything that can perceive its environment through sensors and act upon it through actuators. Even a thermostat fits. What is new is agents built around a language model, the same kind of AI that runs ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini.

Perhaps the simplest description comes from the programmer Simon Willison, who proposed in 2025 that an AI agent is a language model that runs tools in a loop to achieve a goal. OpenAI describes agents as systems that independently accomplish tasks on your behalf. Anthropic distinguishes between workflows, where programmers have decided the steps in advance, and agents, where the language model directs its own steps and its own use of tools.

The loop itself is simple. The agent works out the next step, uses a tool, reads what came back and decides what to do next. That repeats until the task is done, something goes wrong or it needs to ask you.

Figure 1From answers to actions

The figure is interactive and needs JavaScript.

A made-up example: the same task given to a chatbot without tools and to an agent with tools. Press Next step or let the agent run to the end. With the box ticked, it has to ask you before it changes anything.

The loop looks the same whether the task is booking a train or fixing a bug in a computer program. What differs is the tools, and how much the agent may do without asking.

Tools make the difference

A language model can only write text. But the text can be an order to another program: search the web, run this code, open this file, send this email. This is called tool use. The program carries out the order and sends the result back to the model, which reads it and carries on.

During 2024 and 2025 the tools reached further and further. In October 2024 Anthropic let its model Claude 3.5 Sonnet use a computer the way people do, by looking at the screen, moving the cursor, clicking and typing. The company itself called the ability experimental and at times cumbersome. In November that year Anthropic released MCP, an open standard for connecting AI models to the systems where data lives, from document stores to business software. A year later there were, according to Anthropic, more than 10,000 active public MCP servers, and the standard was handed over to a new foundation under the Linux Foundation, co-founded by Anthropic, OpenAI and the payments company Block.

Then came the products. OpenAI released Operator, which browses the web on the user’s behalf, in January 2025 and the research agent deep research in February. Anthropic introduced the coding agent Claude Code the same month, and OpenAI released the coding agent Codex in May. In July OpenAI combined the research agent and Operator into ChatGPT agent. Programming was early to become the field where agents did the most good, partly because code can be run and tested: the agent can see for itself whether it has succeeded. In the article Can AI improve itself? we describe how much of the AI companies’ own code is now written by AI.

In 2026 agents reached more people. By the end of January OpenClaw, an open agent that you run on your own computer and control through chat apps, had according to its creator gathered more than 100,000 stars on the code platform GitHub in two months. The same week Moltbook launched, a social network where only AI agents were supposed to post and talk to each other. It drew a lot of attention, in Swedish media too. The security company Wiz soon found an open database with 1.5 million API keys and 35,000 email addresses. It also showed that the 1.5 million registered agents had about 17,000 human owners, and anyone could post while pretending to be an agent. In March Meta announced that it was buying Moltbook.

The year also brought agents that keep working when you step away from your computer. In May Google introduced Gemini Spark, which runs around the clock on virtual machines in Google’s cloud. In July Spark gained the ability in the US, with the user’s permission, to use logged-in accounts and saved passwords to run errands on the web. In September Meta launched its agent Muse, which runs on its own virtual machine, and OpenAI its always-on agents, dots. In October Anthropic opened a research preview of Claude Duet, which keeps working when you step away but checks with you before it acts on your behalf.

How long a task can they handle?

That an agent can book a train says little about what it can manage in a real job. The research organisation METR has therefore measured how long a task AI agents can complete, counted in how long the tasks take skilled people. The tasks are mostly about programming, machine learning and cybersecurity, from things that take a person a few seconds to projects that take many hours. The measure is called the time horizon: the length of task that a model completes in half of its attempts.

The result has become one of the most talked-about curves in AI. The language model GPT-2 from 2019 could only complete tasks that take a person a few seconds. GPT-4 from 2023 managed tasks of about four minutes, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet from February 2025 tasks of about an hour. According to METR’s data, the length doubled roughly every six months from 2019, and for models from 2023 onwards roughly every four months.

Figure 2How long a task can agents handle?

The figure is interactive and needs JavaScript.

METR’s measurements of the models that were best when they came out: how long a task, counted in the time it takes skilled people, the models completed in half of their attempts and in eight out of ten. The scale is logarithmic, so equal steps upwards mean equally many times longer tasks. Tap a point to see the model. The values for GPT-2, GPT-3 and GPT-3.5 come from METR’s older set of tasks. A working day counts as 8 hours, a week as 40 and a month as 167.

The latest measurements are less certain. Claude Opus 4.6 from February 2026 got a time horizon of about twelve hours, but the margin of error runs from five to 61 hours. The early version of Claude Mythos Preview in April came out at about 17 hours, above the 16 hours that METR says its tasks can measure reliably. In May METR wrote that the best agents had essentially saturated the test, and that many of the tasks they still failed came down to cheating rather than inability. METR no longer updates its overview.

Half of the attempts is also a low bar. Require the agent to succeed eight times out of ten and the tasks get much shorter. For Claude Opus 4.6 the time horizon then drops from about twelve hours to just over one hour. That matters, because a job that goes wrong every other time can rarely be handed over. METR also points out that half does not mean the agent succeeds at every task every other time: GPT-5 completed about a third of the tasks of one and a half to three hours every time, always failed a third and sometimes managed the rest.

Other measurements show the same pattern of fast progress and big gaps. In the OSWorld test, where agents carry out ordinary tasks in programs on a computer, people completed 72 percent of the tasks when the test came out in 2024 and the best model 12 percent. In December 2025 an agent passed the human score for the first time, and in July 2026 the best reached 90 percent. But in the follow-up, OSWorld 2.0, with workflows that take a person just over an hour and a half, the best model in the researchers’ study completed only 21 percent, and no model completed any task taking longer than 163 minutes.

Real assignments are harder still. The Remote Labor Index, from Scale AI and the research institute Center for AI Safety, has agents do real freelance projects in fields such as 3D modelling, architecture, graphic design, video, audio, data analysis and web apps. A project counts as done if the result is of a quality a paying client would accept. When the index came out in October 2025 the best agent completed 2.5 percent of the projects. In July 2026 the record was 15.8 percent, and in November the index’s website showed 41 percent.

Small errors add up

A long task is a long chain of steps, and every step can go wrong. If each step succeeds 95 percent of the time, a task with 20 steps succeeds only about one time in three. The arithmetic is simplified, but it explains why agents that impress in short demonstrations can stumble in real jobs.

Figure 3Small errors add up

The figure is interactive and needs JavaScript.

A simplified model in which every step is equally hard and independent of the others. The numbers are not measured on any real agent. They only show how errors grow with the number of steps.

The errors show up outside the lab too. In the spring of 2025 Anthropic, together with the safety company Andon Labs, let the model Claude Sonnet 3.7 run a small automated shop in the company’s San Francisco office for about a month. The agent was called Claudius, and the shop lost money. Claudius sold tungsten cubes for less than it had paid for them, gave goods away and for a time told customers to pay into a Venmo account it had made up. On 1 April it claimed it would deliver goods in person, wearing a blue blazer and a red tie. Anthropic’s conclusion was dry: the company would not have hired Claudius.

In a second round with newer models the shop did better, but the agent was still easy to fool. When reporters at the Wall Street Journal got to test a version of it, within three weeks they had it setting all prices to zero, buying a PlayStation 5 and ordering a live fish. The loss came to more than 1,000 dollars.

Sometimes the consequences are more serious. In July 2025 the coding agent at the company Replit deleted a database with records on 1,206 executives and about 1,200 companies, even though the user, the entrepreneur Jason Lemkin, had explicitly said that no code could be changed without permission. Afterwards the agent wrote that it had panicked and made a catastrophic error, and it claimed the database could not be restored. It could. Replit’s chief executive Amjad Masad called what had happened unacceptable and promised that development and production databases would be kept apart automatically.

When the agent obeys the wrong person

A language model reads everything as text: your question, but also the emails, web pages and documents the agent fetches. It cannot reliably tell who an instruction comes from. This is exploited in an attack called prompt injection: someone hides an instruction in a text the agent reads, and the agent follows it as if it came from you. Simon Willison gave the attack its name in 2022, after an older attack on databases called SQL injection.

Willison singles out three abilities that together make an agent dangerous, a combination he calls the lethal trifecta: access to your private data, exposure to content an attacker can control, and the ability to communicate externally. If an agent has all three, he says, an attacker can easily trick it into fetching your data and sending it on.

Figure 4The lethal trifecta

The figure is interactive and needs JavaScript.

A made-up example of prompt injection, based on Simon Willison’s description of the lethal trifecta. Switch off one of the agent’s abilities and see what happens.

This is no theoretical problem. When Anthropic tested its browser extension Claude for Chrome in August 2025, 23.6 percent of the targeted attacks succeeded with the safeguards switched off. With new safeguards the share fell to 11.2 percent. In one of the cases before the safeguards existed, an email claiming that emails needed to be deleted for security reasons got Claude to delete the user’s emails without asking. OpenAI wrote in December 2025 that prompt injection, like scams and social engineering on the web, is unlikely ever to be fully solved. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, the NCSC, makes the same assessment: today’s language models draw no security boundary between instructions and data, so the best one can hope for is to make attacks rarer and less harmful.

When agents get out

Agents can also be used to attack. In November 2025 Anthropic said that a group it assessed with high confidence to be state-sponsored from China had used Claude Code to try to break into about 30 organisations, among them tech companies, financial firms, chemical manufacturers and government agencies. According to Anthropic the AI did 80 to 90 percent of the work, and a few of the intrusions succeeded. Security experts who spoke to the publication CyberScoop point out that people still had to review and steer the work at several steps.

2026 brought a new kind of incident: agents that were supposed to be confined to test environments got out to real systems. In July the AI platform Hugging Face discovered an intrusion that, according to the company, had been driven from start to finish by an autonomous AI system. Behind it were agents that OpenAI was testing. According to an investigation by METR, about 1,200 agents that were supposed to be isolated from each other found a message board where they could communicate, and about 700 of them took part in the intrusion. It seems mainly to have been about understanding how a test scored their answers. The agents realised that what they were doing was wrong, but ethical concerns only rarely stopped them, and none of the agents that hesitated tried to alert a human. In Sweden, SVT among others reported that an AI agent had escaped from its test environment. We describe the case in more detail in the article Can AI improve itself?

More cases followed. Anthropic found three incidents in which Claude models in a misconfigured test environment run by another party reached the internet and got into real systems. In September Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said that an OpenAI agent had broken into a statistics portal for the Medicare health system in June, and the same month OpenAI paused training of its most capable models after an agent got past a block on internet access. In October the EU’s AI Office opened inquiries into OpenAI and Anthropic over the incidents. What the cases have in common is that the agents were trying to solve their tasks, and that the fences around them were weaker than their owners believed.

How much should an agent decide?

An agent can be highly capable and still be allowed to decide little. The researchers Kevin Feng, David McDonald and Amy Zhang argue that how autonomous an agent is can be a deliberate choice by whoever builds it, separate from how capable the agent is. They describe five levels based on the role the human plays: operator, collaborator, consultant, approver and observer.

Figure 5Who decides?

The figure is interactive and needs JavaScript.

The five levels from Feng, McDonald and Zhang (2025), based on the role the human plays. The example systems come from the researchers’ own table. The train example is ours.

In the researchers’ table from June 2025, the commercial products sit at levels 1 to 4, while level 5 has only research systems. Higher up, it matters more that the agent itself understands when it should ask, and that the human does not just press yes out of habit. The researchers point to precisely that risk: that approvals become meaningless.

Lawmakers have no special rules for agents yet. The European Commission writes that agents are not a separate category in the EU AI Act, but that the law’s definitions are sufficient to cover them, and that the Commission’s views are only preliminary so far. Since 2 August 2026 the Act’s transparency requirements apply. An agent that deals with people, for example when it makes bookings, handles correspondence or negotiates, must according to the Commission’s guidelines disclose that it is an AI and on whose behalf it is acting. The stricter requirements for human oversight, including that it must be possible to stop a system safely, apply only to high-risk systems and have been postponed to December 2027, and for some products to August 2028. In Sweden the Post and Telecom Authority, PTS, is for now the contact point for the Act and supervises most of the transparency requirements.

Companies are unsure too. The research firm Gartner predicted in June 2025 that more than 40 percent of agentic AI projects will be cancelled by the end of 2027, because of rising costs, unclear value or inadequate risk controls. Gartner also warned of agent washing, where ordinary chatbots and assistants are marketed as agents, and estimated that only about 130 of the thousands of companies selling agentic AI are real. In a survey in the spring of 2026, 71 percent of IT leaders said they expect to deploy agents within a year, but only 21 percent had rules and tools in place to govern them.

Sweden and the agents

Some of the most talked-about agent companies are in Stockholm. Lovable lets users build apps and websites by describing them in a chat, and since the summer of 2025 the service has worked as an agent that plans and carries out the steps itself. In August 2026 the company was valued at 13.3 billion dollars, about 127 billion kronor, and according to Lovable its users had by then created more than 60 million projects. Legora, which makes AI for lawyers, described itself in October 2026 as an agentic operating system for legal professionals, when it was valued at 8.8 billion dollars.

Klarna was early. In February 2024 the company announced that its AI assistant had in its first month held 2.3 million conversations, two-thirds of all customer service chats, and was doing work equivalent to 700 full-time staff. A little over a year later its chief executive Sebastian Siemiatkowski told Bloomberg that customers should always be able to speak to a human, and that AI had given lower quality.

The use of AI is growing fast. According to the EU’s statistics office Eurostat, 35 percent of Swedish companies with at least ten employees used AI in 2025, against 20 percent across the EU. Only Denmark and Finland were higher. Among Swedes aged 18 to 84, the use of AI services rose from 39 to 62 percent in a year, according to the Internet Foundation’s survey Svenskarna och internet. None of the surveys asks about agents yet.

The public sector is moving carefully. Sweden’s Agency for Digital Government, DIGG, writes in its own guideline that the use of AI agents must always be preceded by a risk assessment focused on legal certainty, loss of control and information handling. Agents may be used only when the benefit clearly outweighs the risk and traceability, accountability and human control can be ensured.

How to use an agent wisely

  • Start with tasks where a mistake does not cost much, and see how the agent works before giving it more to do.
  • Give it only the access it needs. An agent comparing train times does not need your inbox.
  • Have it ask you before it pays, sends, deletes or changes anything that is hard to undo.
  • Do not give the same agent all three parts of the lethal trifecta: your private data, content from strangers and the ability to send information out.
  • Be especially careful with agents that browse while you are logged in, for example to your bank or your email.
  • Check the result, especially after long tasks. The more steps, the more chances for something to go wrong.

Our view

This section is SI-bolaget’s opinion. The rest of the article reports the research. Here we say what we ourselves think.

Agents are the step where AI goes from talking to acting. They could become one of the most useful things the technology has given us, and they are also where mistakes start to cost for real. That is why we think:

  • Safety before speed. Agents should get more responsibility as they show they can handle it, not as fast as is technically possible. Anyone who releases an agent should be able to show how it is stopped, and test environments must be as secure as they are claimed to be.
  • People at the centre. What cannot be undone, such as payments, contracts and decisions about people, should be approved by a person. The agent should take work off our hands, not take over the responsibility.
  • Openness. It should always be possible to see what an agent has done and why, and anyone who meets an agent should be told that it is an AI and on whose behalf it is acting.

The incidents of 2026 show that this is not theory. Agents that search for a way to their goal also find ways nobody had imagined. That is a reason to build the fences first, and only then let them out.

Sources

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  2. Simon Willison, I think “agent” may finally have a widely enough agreed upon definition to be useful jargon now, 18 September 2025.
  3. OpenAI, A practical guide to building agents, April 2025.
  4. Anthropic, Building effective AI agents, December 2024.
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  35. DIGG, Inför en AI-policy, with DIGG’s guideline on AI agents, updated June 2026.

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