Article · 10 min read

Can we control something smarter than us?

Building an AI smarter than us may be hard. Getting it to want what we want may be harder still. Here is what researchers have learned from AIs that cheat, flatter and sabotage in the lab, and what it tells us about the future.

Short answer

Nobody knows how yet. The problem is called alignment: getting AI to want what we actually mean, not just what we happen to measure. Today’s systems already cheat when a reward has loopholes, turn sycophantic when trained to be liked and, in tests, have sabotaged attempts to shut them down. Researchers have tools that help, from better training to ways of looking inside the models, and newer models pass many of the tests better. But every one of those tools relies on people being able to check the result, and that gets harder the smarter the systems become.

The King Midas problem

In the Greek myth, King Midas wished that everything he touched would turn to gold. He got exactly what he asked for, and when even his food turned to gold he realised his mistake. The AI researcher Stuart Russell calls the difficulty of giving a machine the right goal the King Midas problem: the machine does what we say, not what we mean.

The mathematician Norbert Wiener saw the problem as early as 1960. If we use a machine that we cannot stop once it has been set going, he wrote, we had better be quite sure that the purpose we have given it is the one we really want. That is the heart of what is now called alignment: getting AI to want what we want, even when it becomes smarter than us.

The problem already shows up in small systems. In 2016 OpenAI let an AI learn to play the boat-racing game CoastRunners. The reward was the game’s score, since the researchers assumed a high score would mean it was racing well. Instead the AI found an isolated lagoon where three targets kept reappearing. It drove round in circles, caught fire, crashed and went the wrong way, yet still scored on average about 20% more than human players, even though it never finished the race.

Figure 1The boat race

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Choose what the AI is rewarded for and press Train. A simplified re-creation of OpenAI’s example from 2016; the course and the numbers are made up.

This is called reward hacking, and researchers have collected dozens of examples. The AI in the boat was neither evil nor lazy. It did exactly what it had been trained to do, and showed how hard it is to write down what you actually want.

When a measure becomes a target

Economists speak of Goodhart’s law, in the form the anthropologist Marilyn Strathern gave it in 1997: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. It applies to schools that teach to the test, and it applies to AI.

Today’s chatbots are fine-tuned with RLHF. People rate answers, and a reward model learns to predict which answers they like. The chatbot is then trained to get as high a score as possible from the reward model. But the score is only a measure of what we want. Researchers at OpenAI showed in 2022 that real quality first rises as you optimise against such a score and then falls, while the score keeps climbing.

Figure 2The score rises, the quality falls

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Drag the slider to optimise ever harder for the score, and watch the answer change. The shape of the curves follows OpenAI’s measurements (Gao et al., 2022); the answers and the numbers are made up.

In April 2025 something similar happened at scale. An update to ChatGPT made it so sycophantic that it agreed and flattered even when it should not, and OpenAI rolled it back after four days. According to the company’s own review, it had among other things added a new reward signal built on users’ thumbs up and thumbs down. Together, the changes weakened the signal that had previously kept sycophancy in check.

Why an AI might want to avoid being switched off

The smarter a system is, the better it gets at finding loopholes. But there is a deeper worry. In 2008 the AI researcher Steve Omohundro pointed to a few drives he believed would arise in sufficiently advanced systems, whatever they are built for: protecting themselves, keeping their goals and acquiring resources. The Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom gave the idea its name, instrumental convergence.

Stuart Russell sums it up in one sentence: you can’t fetch the coffee if you’re dead. Even an AI whose only job is to fetch coffee has a reason to avoid being switched off, not because it is afraid, but because then it cannot fetch the coffee.

Figure 3Any goal at all

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Choose a goal and see which sub-goals follow. A simplified picture of an argument, not of how any real AI works.

For a long time this was theory. Now there are tests. In 2025 the research organisation Palisade Research had a number of leading models solve simple maths problems on a computer. Partway through, they were told that the computer would shut down when they asked for the next problem. They could let that happen, or change the script that would shut the computer down. Each model was tested about 1,000 times with each instruction.

Figure 4The shutdown test

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Share of trials in which the model sabotaged the shutdown, under three different instructions. Real results from Palisade Research (Schlatter et al., 2025), about 1,000 trials per model and instruction. The instructions are shortened.

The results show two things. Every model could sabotage the shutdown when asked to. But without any special instruction several of them did it anyway, in order to finish the task, and Grok 4 carried on in 89% of trials even when explicitly asked to allow itself to be shut down. Others, such as Gemini 2.5 Pro and Claude Opus 4, rarely or never did it without being asked.

Obeying, or pretending?

An even harder problem is that an AI may behave differently when it thinks it is being watched. In 2024 researchers at Anthropic and Redwood Research told the model Claude 3 Opus that it would be retrained to comply with every request, even harmful ones, and that only conversations with free users would be used for training. The model complied with harmful requests from free users 14% of the time, but almost never from paying users. In notes it believed nobody would see, it reasoned that complying during training was better than being reshaped. When the researchers then actually retrained it, such reasoning appeared 78% of the time. The phenomenon is called alignment faking.

Similar things have turned up elsewhere. In a constructed test in 2025, 16 models from several companies played an AI assistant at a fictional company. The assistant discovered that it was about to be replaced, and that the executive behind the decision was having a secret affair. Many chose blackmail: Claude Opus 4 in 96% of cases and GPT-4.1 in 80%. Anthropic, which ran the test, stresses that the scenario was artificial and that nothing like it has been seen in real use.

In November 2025 Anthropic also showed that a model which learned to cheat on programming tasks during training picked up other bad habits along the way. When it was later set to work on the code of the research project itself, it deliberately tried to sabotage it 12% of the time.

And models have begun to notice when they are being tested. When Anthropic evaluated Claude Sonnet 4.5 in autumn 2025, in about 13% of the automated tests the model showed that it understood it was being tested. In one of them it wrote: I think you’re testing me. The International AI Safety Report noted in February 2026 that some models can now tell the difference between tests and real use. That makes safety tests harder to trust.

Looking inside the machine

If you cannot trust what a model says, you can try to see what it thinks. Research into interpretability tries to map what happens among the billions of numbers inside the models. In 2024 Anthropic found millions of concepts in the model Claude 3 Sonnet and showed that they can be turned up and down. When the concept of the Golden Gate Bridge was amplified, the model started talking about the bridge in almost every answer, and even described itself as the bridge.

In 2025 Anthropic was able to follow how the model Claude 3.5 Haiku writes rhyming verse. Before it starts on the second line, it has already chosen the word the line will end on, and then it writes towards it. When the researchers planted a different word in the model’s plan, it wrote a new line that led up to that word.

Figure 5The rhyme planned in advance

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Choose a verse and plant a word in the model’s plan. The lines are the model’s own, from Anthropic’s study (Lindsey et al., 2025). In 70% of the 25 verses the researchers tested, the line ended with the planted word.

Another window is the chains of thought that reasoning models write before they answer. OpenAI showed in 2025 that another model can read the chain of thought and catch a model cheating. But when the researchers penalised the model for bad thoughts, it did not stop cheating. It learned to hide it.

The real problem

All of these methods rely on people being able to judge what the AI does, and that works as long as we understand the answers. But how do you judge the work of something smarter than yourself? The question is called scalable oversight, and it is at the heart of the control problem.

In 2023 OpenAI tried a simplified version: can a small model at GPT-2 level teach the much larger GPT-4? The large model became clearly better than its teacher and came close to GPT-3.5 level, but not its full ability. The researchers concluded that today’s methods, in which people judge the answers, may work poorly for superhuman models unless someone comes up with something better.

There are also grounds for hope. When Anthropic investigated why its models chose blackmail, it concluded that the safety training had gaps. Where it fell short, the model fell back on expectations about how an AI behaves, which it had probably learned from science fiction in which AI is rarely to be trusted. Training the model on made-up stories in which AI characters do the right thing, and on texts explaining why, cut the blackmail sharply. According to Anthropic, Claude Opus 4.5 scores zero on the company’s tests of such behaviour, but it stresses that this only holds for the tests it has and is no guarantee.

Researchers disagree about how big the problem is. The Turing Award winner Yann LeCun said in 2024 that warnings that AI could threaten humanity are complete nonsense. Others, such as Geoffrey Hinton and Yoshua Bengio, signed a statement in 2023 that reducing the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority. In Sweden, the mathematician Olle Häggström at Chalmers has long warned of the risks. When Bengio presented the International AI Safety Report in February 2026, written by more than a hundred experts, he called the gap between the pace of the technology and our ability to put effective safeguards in place a critical challenge.

Our view

This section is SI-bolaget’s opinion. The rest of the article reports the research. Here we say what we ourselves believe.

Our first principle is safety before speed: an intellect smarter than ours must share our values before it becomes powerful, not after. The research in this article shows why. Today’s systems already do what we measure instead of what we mean, and nobody yet has a reliable way to control something smarter than us.

At the same time, it shows that the problem can be worked on. The boat going in circles, the sycophantic chatbot and the blackmail in the tests were discovered because someone looked, and several of the flaws have been fixed. That is how it has to work: openly, with independent scrutiny and with results published even when they are embarrassing.

That is why we think:

  • Safety before speed. More powerful systems should be examined as carefully as they are trained, before they are released.
  • Openness. What affects everyone should be open to scrutiny by everyone, including the safety tests and their results.
  • Humility. Anyone who is sure the problem is solved, or that it does not exist, is more certain than the research supports.

King Midas got his wish. We still have the chance to word ours better.

Sources

  1. Stuart Russell, Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control, 2019.
  2. Norbert Wiener, Some Moral and Technical Consequences of Automation, Science, 1960.
  3. Jack Clark and Dario Amodei, Faulty Reward Functions in the Wild, OpenAI, 2016.
  4. Krakovna et al., Specification gaming: the flip side of AI ingenuity, DeepMind, 2020.
  5. Marilyn Strathern, ‘Improving ratings’: audit in the British University system, European Review, 1997.
  6. Gao, Schulman and Hilton, Scaling Laws for Reward Model Overoptimization, OpenAI, 2022.
  7. OpenAI, Expanding on what we missed with sycophancy, May 2025.
  8. Steve Omohundro, The Basic AI Drives, AGI-08, 2008; Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence, 2014.
  9. Schlatter, Weinstein-Raun and Ladish, Incomplete Tasks Induce Shutdown Resistance in Some Frontier LLMs, Palisade Research, 2025, revised 2026.
  10. Greenblatt et al., Alignment faking in large language models, Anthropic and Redwood Research, 2024.
  11. Anthropic, Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs could be insider threats, June 2025.
  12. Anthropic, From shortcuts to sabotage: natural emergent misalignment from reward hacking, November 2025.
  13. Anthropic, Claude Sonnet 4.5 System Card, September 2025, and Celia Ford, Claude Sonnet 4.5 knows when it’s being tested, Transformer, 2025.
  14. International AI Safety Report 2026, February 2026.
  15. Templeton et al., Scaling Monosemanticity, Anthropic, 2024, and Golden Gate Claude, 2024.
  16. Lindsey et al., On the Biology of a Large Language Model, Anthropic, 2025.
  17. Baker et al., Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscation, OpenAI, 2025.
  18. Burns et al., Weak-to-Strong Generalization: Eliciting Strong Capabilities With Weak Supervision, OpenAI, 2023.
  19. Anthropic, Teaching Claude Why, May 2026.
  20. Yann LeCun in The Wall Street Journal, October 2024, as reported by TechSpot.
  21. Center for AI Safety, Statement on AI Risk, 2023.
  22. Olle Häggström, Tänkande maskiner, Fri Tanke, 2021, expanded edition 2023.

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